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REGULATION OF BosINEss-P.RoOF oF SELLE.Rs' CosTs IN RoBINSON-PATMAN AcT BUYER PROCEEDINGS-The Robinson-Patman Act!was passed in 1936 as an amendment to the Clayton Act.2 Its purpose
was to strengthen section 2, which, as interpreted by the courts,3 was
ineffective as a weapon for combatting price discrimination.4
The threads of legislative policy which ultimately became the
Robinson-Patman Act are traceable to several sources; although the
original Patman House bill was written by the general counsel for
the National Wholesale Grocers Association,5 the act finally passed
was a potpourri including ideas developed from other bills as well.6
One policy in the act is the regulation of discriminatory pricing practices injurious to particular competitors.7 Another policy is the prevention in their incipiency of offenses against the antitrust laws.8 Per. haps the dominant policy to which the Robinson-Patman Act gives
expression is that of equalizing the competitive opportunity of small,
independent businesses9 with that of the large chains.10
Experience in applying the act has demonstrated that its tangled
threads of policy do not produce harmonious patterns in all situations.
The conflict between the policy of "soft" competition through protecting particular groups of competitors which the Robinson-Patman Act
reflects and the general antitrust policy of ''hard" competition through
protecting the competitive process as a whole is the reason for a part
149 Stat. L 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. (1946) §13, amending §2 of the Clayton Act,
38 Stat. L. 730 (1914).
2 See genernlly AoSTIN, PmCB DiscRIMINA'I'ION AND RELATED PnoBLEMs UNDER nm
RoBINSON•PATMAN Ac:r (1952); OPPENm!IM, UNFAIR TRADn !'RACTicns: CASns, CoMMENTs AND MATERIALS 1003 et seq. (1950): QppENBEI?,r, Pmcm AND SERVICE DtsCllIMINATIONS UNDER nm RoBINSON-PATMAN Ac:r, Syllabus (1949); N.Y. STAT.S BAR AsSN.,
RoBINSON·PA'l'MAN Ac:r SnD?OSIA (1946, 1947, 1948); Haslett, ''Price Discriminations
and their Justifications under the Robinson-Patman Act or 1936," 46 Mrcm. L. Iuw. 450
(1948); PATMAN, THB RoBINSON·PATMAN Ac:r (1938).
s See Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. FI'C, (6th Cir. 1939) 101 F. (2d) 620, in
which the old §2 of the Clayton Act was interpreted to allow price differentials based on
differences in the quantities purchased whether or not they represented cost savings.
4 See H. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d sess., p. 6 (1936).
Ii Hearing 'before the House Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 8442, H.R. 4995,
and H.R. 5062, 74th Cong., 1st sess., p. 9 (1935).
6 For steps in the legislative mcubation, see Freer, "Introduction to Section 2," CCH
SYlln>OSIUM ON nm RoBINSON-PATMAN Ac:n: 5 (1946).
'l See Oppenheim, ''Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National
Antitrust Policy," 50 M:rCH. L. REv. 1139 at 1198 et seq. (1952).
s Id. at 1200.
9 ''The pw:pose of this proposed legislation is to restore, so far as possible, equality of
opportunity in 'business•••• Your committee is of the opinion that the evidence is over•
whelming that price discrimination practices exist to such an extent that the sutVival of
independent merchants, manufacturers, and other businessmen is seriously periled. • • ."
H. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d sess., p. 3 (1936).
10 See F.BDBRAL TRAD:s CoMMissroN, FINAL RnPonT ON nm Cwm STon:s INv:ssnGATION, S. Doc~ No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st sess. (1934).
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of the interpretative difficulty.11 Another part of the interpretative
difficulty is caused by the omissions and inconsistencies present in the
language of the statute;12 these plus statutory ambiguities make reference to legislative history a necessary but not always fruitful part of
construing the act.13
Although the courts have not had occasion to consider all of the
questions which the language of the Robinson-Patman Act leaves
unanswered, the Supreme Court's needle of judicial interpretation
made some progress in knitting the threads of statutory policy together
in the recent case of Automatic Canteen Co. of America 17. Federal
Trade Commission.14 This is the first case in which the Supreme
Court considered a section 2(f) buyer proceeding.
The purposes of this comment are to analyze the holding of the
Court in the Automatic Canteen case and to relate the language of
the opinion to the more general problem of defining the extent of
buyer responsibility under section 2(f). As a preliminary matter, however, it is necessary to examine the pertinent statutory provisions.
Section 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act makes it unlawful for
buyers in interstate commerce"... knowingly to induce or receive a
· discrimination in price which is prohibited by this section."15 In other
words, it prohibits buyers from knowingly inducing or receiving the
benefit of price discriminations as they are defined by the rest of the
section.16
11 Oppenheim, ''Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust Policy," 50 M:rCR. L. Rav. 1139 at 1198 (1952). See Learned and Isaacs, "The
Robinson-Patman Law: Some Assumptions and Expectations," 15 H.A:av. Bus. Rav. 137
(1937).
12 ''You might as well know that the bill finally agreed upon by the conferees •••
contains many inconsistencies, and the courts will have the devil's own job to unravel the
tangle." Representative Celler, 80 CoNG. Rae. 9419 (1936). " ••• precision of e.,-pression
is not an outstanding characteristic of the Robinson-Patman Act. •••" Automatic Canteen
Co. of America v. FI'C, 346 U.S. 61 at 65, 73 S.Ct. 1017 (1953). See the dissent of
Justice Jackson in FI'C v. Ruberoid, 343 U.S. 470 at 483-487, 72 S.Ct. 800 (1952), and
the dissenting opinion of Justice Franltfurter in FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv•
ice, 344 U.S. 392 at 405, 73 S.Ct. 361 (1953).
13 For suggested changes in the language of the act, see Oppenheim, ''Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust Policy," 50 M:rcm:. L. Rav.
1139 at 1198 et seq. (1952); Kelley, "Should the Law of Section 2 be Revised?" N.Y.
STATE BAR AsSN., Ro:amsoN-PATMAN Aar Sn.n>osrcnr 114 (1948).
14346 U.S. 61, 73 S.Ct. 1017 (1953).
1 5 This subsection has been described as an mtegral part of the enforcement scheme of
the act because it makes it easier for sellers ". • • to resist the demand for sacrificial price
cuts coming from mass-buyer customers.•••" Representative Utterback, 80 CoNG. Rae.
9419 (1936). See Forkner, ''The Significance of Section 2(£)," N.Y. STAT.a BAR AsSN.,
Ro:amsoN-PATMAN Am: Sn,n,oSitIM 66 (1948).
l6The problems mvolved m relating §§2(c) (brokerage fees), 2(d) (payments to
buyers for services and facilities), and 2(e) (furnishing services and facilities to buyers)
to §2(f) is beyond the scope of this comment. For materials on these problems, see ()pl'EN•
HBIM, UNFAIR TRADE PnA.CTICBs: CASEs, CoMl\mNTs AND MATERIAI.S 1221 et seq. (1950).
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Under section 2(a), it is unlawful for sellers engaged in interstate
commerce to make price discriminations in interstate transactions. The
price discriminations prohibited are those which apply to "commodities
of like grade and quality"17 which are sold for resale or consumption
within the jurisdiction of the United States and where the effect of
the discrimination "may . . . substantially . . • lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure,
destroy, or prevent competition18 with any person who either grants or
1mowingly1 9 receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them." This legislative definition is qualified by
certain provisos. The most important proviso from the standpoint of
buyer liability is the :6.rst,20 which excepts "differentials" making "only
due allowance for differences in . . . cost . . . resulting from the
different methods or quantities in which such commodities are . . .
sold or delivered."
Section 2(b) 21 puts the burden of rebutting a prima facie case
of discrimination by showing justification on the "person charged
with a violation." "Unless justification shall be affirmatively shown,"
the Commission is authorized to issue a cease and desist order.22 This
17 Cf. the difference :in the language 0£ §3, which uses the terms "like grade, quality,
and quantity."
IS Although the burden is on the Commission to show that a dic:criroiu~tion has the
required effect on competition, it is sufficient i£ the Commission can show that the discrimination may injure competition. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 68 S.Ct. 822
(1948). The dissenting justices :in that case said that the statutory language should be read
to require a showing of the 1}Tobability 0£ an adverse effect on competition.
19 For an explanation 0£ the reason for inserting this word, see H. Rep. No. 2951, 74th
Cong,, 2d sess,, pp. 5-6 (1936).
20 The others are related to the fixing 0£ quantity limits by the Federal Trade Commission, the selection 0£ customers, and p*e changes reHecting market changes.
21 For the circumstances 0£ the incorporation 0£ this subsection into the bill, see 80
CoNG, REc. 6435 (1936).
22 Buyers also may be subject to proceedings brought by the Department 0£ Justice to
impose the criminal sanctions 0£ §3 0£ the Robinson-Patman Act, or to enjoin violations 0£
the Clayton Act or the Sherman Antitrust Act. Private persons may bring actions to enjoin
violations 0£ the antitrust laws :in the federal courts, 38 Stat. L. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C.
(1946) §26, or may seek treble damages under §4 0£ the Clayton Act. For a successful
treble damage suit against a seller, see Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., (8th
Cir. 1945) 150 F. (2d) 988, cert. den. 326 U.S. 773, 66 S.Ct. 231 (1945). See American
Cooperative Serum Assn. v. Anchor Serum Co., (7th Cir. 1946) 153 F. (2d) 907, :in
which successful treble damage actions were brought against both seller and buyer for violations 0£ §§2(a), 2(c), 2(d), and 2(£) 0£ the Robinson-Patman Act. For the purpose of
an action by a private person, a final judgment or decree :in a proceeding by the federal
government is prima facie evidence 0£ the violation. 38 Stat. L. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C.
(1946) §16. For an unsuccessful attempt to use a Robinson-Patman Act violation as a
defense :in a suit to recover on promissory notes, see Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can
Co., 330 U.S. 743, 67 S.Ct. 1015 (1947).
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subsection has a proviso which has, been interpreted as providing for
an affirmative defense by sellers.23

' Case: Bi1,yer Knowledge in
I. The Automatic Canteen
Section 2(f) Proceedings

The Automatic Canteen case involved a buyer proceeding instituted
by the Federal Trade Commission under section 2(f) of the RobinsonPatman Act. The Commission introduced evidence to show that the
Automatic Canteen Co., a large buyer of candy for resale through 230,000 automatic vending machines in thirty-three states and the District
of Columbia, solicited prices which it lmew were as much as thirty-three
percent lower than prices quoted other purchasers.24 The Commission did not attempt to show that the company's knowledge included
the information that these price differences were not justified by cost
savings,25 and the Automatic Canteen Co. moved to dismiss on the
ground that the Commission had failed to make out a prima facie
case of violation of section 2(f). The Commission issued a cease and
desist order,26 the court of appeals affirmed,21 and the Supreme Court,
on certiorari, reversed. Speaking through Justice Frankfurter, the
Court held that the Commission must introduce evidence of respondent's lmowledge of the absence of cost justification as a part of its
prima facie case against a buyer.28
23 " ••• nothing ••• shall prevent a seller from rebutting" a "prima facie case ••• by
showing that his lower price ••• was made in good faith" to meet competition. See Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 340 U.S. 231 at 243, 71 S.Ct. 240 (1951).
24Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FI'C, 346 U.S. 61 at 62, 73 S.Ct. 1017
(1953).
2G Since it previously had been held that one of the Automatic Canteen Company's
largest sellers had made price discriminations violative of §2(a), it seems doubtful if all
of the price differentials in this case could have been justified by cost savings. See Curtiss
Candy Co., 48 F.T.C. 161 (1951). See also Drain, "A Buyer's View of the RobinsonPatman Act," 16 J.B.A. D.C. 245 (1949), which notes the "chain reaction series of proceedings" against suppliers of Curtiss (Com Products Relining Co. and A. E. Staley Mfg.
Co.), then against Curtiss, and finally against Automatic Canteen Co., the largest purchaser
from Curtiss.
.
26 Automatic Canteen Co. of America, 46 F.T.C. 861 (1950).
21 Largely on the authority of FI'C v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 68 S.Ct. 822
(1948). Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FfC, (7th Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 433.
2 B Poi: a general discussion of the decision, see Baker, ''The Automatic Canteen CaseBuyer Liability under the Robinson-Patman Act," UNIVERSITY OP MicmcAN LA.w SCHOOL,
INsnTOT:E ON FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAws 140 (1953). In this paper, the two most significant aspects of the Canteen case are said to be (I) "a clear cut victory of hard versus
soft competition" and (2) "decisive rejection of the 'simplified enforcement' sought to 'be
established by the Commission." As a result of the Automatic Canteen decision, the Commission recently dismissed buyer proceedings against the Crown Zellerbach Corp. (F.T.C.
Dkt. 5421), Safeway Stores, Inc. (F.T.C. Dkt. 5990), and the Kroger Co. (F.T.C. Dkt.
5991) on the ground that there was not sufficient evidence to satisfy the knowledge requirement. 3 CCH TRADE REc. REP., 9th ed., ,mn,466, 11,474, and 11,513 (1953).
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Although the Court in the Automatic Canteen case expressly
limited its decision to the narrow question before it,29 the opinion
included some suggestions as to what evidence the Commission might
use to satisfy the knowledge requirement. Trade experienc~, size of
the differential compared with differences in the quantities ·ordered,
and a comparison of the prices and services received with those given
other buyers all might be utilized in the proper circumstances to make
a prima facie showing that the buyer either knew or should have
known that the price differentials given him were not justified by
cost savings. The general test of knowledge suggested by the Court
was whether the buyer reasonably could have thought his price differential justified by cost savings.30
It is suggested in the Automatic Canteen opinion that the Commission had sufficient evidence to make a prima facie showing of
knowledge had it seen fit to use the evidence in that way. The Court
thought that a situation which might satisfy the lrnowledge requirement is one in which the buyer requests and receives large price differentials based upon what it tells its sellers that their cost savings
will be. Although the Commission had recited such instances, it had
not found that they would provoke inquiry in the mind of a reasonably
prudent businessman. The Court therefore was not presented with a
case in which the Commission had concluded that the circumstances
warranted an inference of knowledge of lack of cost justification.31

II. The Automatic Canteen Case: What the Court
Did Not Decide
Perhaps the questions which the Court discussed but did not decide
in the Automatic Canteen case are as instructive from the standpoint
of interpreting section 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act as its narrow
holding.
A. The Meaning of Discrimination. The Automatic Canteen
opinion leaves open the question of what is meant by the reference
in section 2(f) to price discriminations "prohibited by this section."
It still can be argued that that reference is made for the sole purpose
of defining the term "price discrimination" and not for the purpose
of spelling out a rule of procedure in buyer proceedings. If this is
29 ''We ••• think it imperative in this case to conline ourselves as much as possible to
what is in dispute here." Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FfC, 346 U.S. 61 at 65,
73 S.Ct. 1017 (1953).
30Jd. at 80.
3tJd. at 66.
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true, it follows that the procedural provisions in the act are not necessarily applicable to section 2(£). A reference to legislative history
indicating that the procedural section 2(b) was not intended to apply
to section 2(£) at the time it·was adopted32 tends to support the
view
1
that it is inapplicable.33

B. The Burden of Proving Costs. The Court in the Automatic
Canteen case did not decide that the burden of proving the existence of
cost justification is on the buyer once the Commission has made a
prima facie case. It did not decide that the Morton Salt decision,3 4
a proceeding against a seller placing the burden of proving cost justification on the seller,36 is a binding precedent on the question of burden
of proof in buyer proceedings. In addition, the Court expressly did
not decide that section 2(b) is applicable in section 2(f) proceedings.36
Even if section 2(b) were held to be applicable in section 2(£) proceedings, the Court suggested that because of its ambiguity it should
be construed as enacting the ordinary rules of evidence.37
One such rule is that the burden of proof is on the party having
the affirmative of an issue.38 Since section 2(f) requires a "discrimination" in order for there to be a violation in a buyer case, the application of that rule would place upon the Commission the burden of
proving a "discrimination" as defined by the rest of the section; i.e.,
it would have to prove, among other things, the existence of a differential exceeding any cost savings.39
32 The amendment which became §2(b) was proposed before §2(£) had been incorporated in the act, although the two subsections were included in the Senate bill almost con•
temporaneously by amendment from the Hoor. 80 CoNG. B.Ec. 6435, 7428 (1936).
33 See Howrey, "The Buyer and a Prima Facie Case," N.Y. STATS BAR AsSN., RonINSON•PA·rMAN ACT Sn.lPOSIUM 87 at 88 (1948).
34 FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 68 S.Ct. 822 (1948).
35 See Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 378. Cf. FTC v.
Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 at 721, 68 S.Ct. 793 (1948).
36 " ••• we do not decide that because we reach the same result without it. •••" The
Court further indicated that even i£ §2(b) were to be applied in §2(£) proceedings, its
"infelicitous language'' would be construed as enacting the ordinary rules o.1: evidence. Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FfC, 346 U.S. 61 at 78, 73 S.Ct. 1017 (1953). See
also 80 CoNG. R.Ec. 8231 (1936).
87 Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FfC, 346 U.S. 61 at 78, 73 S.Ct. 1017
(1953).
38 9 WxcMoRE, Evml!Nc:s, 3d ed., §2486 (1940). After stating the rule, the author
further observes that there is no "general solvent for all cases. It is merely a question 0£
policy and fairness based on experience in the different situations."
39 A reference to legislative history makes it clear that "discrimination" and "differential" were not thought to be synonymous as they were used in the Robinson-Patman Act.
See Representative Utterback's distinction in 80 CoNc. B.Ec. 9415 (1936). See also
Haslett, "Price Discriminations and their Justifications under the Robinson-Patman Act 0£
1936," 46 Mxca:. L. REv. 450 at 454 (1948); note, 42 h.L. L. REv. 556 (1947). "The bill
expressly exempts from its prohibitions, however, price differentials." 80 CoNc. B.Ec. 9417
(1936). Note also the non-violative use 0£ "differential" in §2(a).
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Although "discrimination" also is used in section 2(a) as part of the
definition of seller responsibility and the Court in the Morton Salt case
put the burden of proving cost justification on the seller, it can be
argued that buyer proceedings should be distinguished from seller proceedings for the following reasons: (1) the legislative history indicates that placing the burden of proof on the seller was the result
intended in seller proceedings,4° but neglects to say anything conclusive about the procedure applicable to buyers; (2) section 2(b) clearly
applies to sellers, but it is not so clear that it applies to buyers-and if
it does apply to buyers, it is not clear that it should be applied in the
same way;41 (3) the presence of the cost savings justification in proviso
form in section 2(a) gives it procedural as weII as definitive significance
in seller proceedings,42 but the reference of section 2(f) to section 2(a)
appears to be for definitive purposes rather than for procedural purposes; and ( 4) there are policy factors, to be considered below, which
provide additional grounds for having a different rule of procedure
applicable in buyer proceedings.

III. Policy Considerations Distinguishing Buyer Proceedings
Since the decision in the Morton Salt case placing the burden of
cost justification on the selier was based largely on the effect of section
2(h), the refusal to hold section 2(h) applicable in section 2(f) proceedings seems to imply that other considerations pertinent to buyer
cases might call for a different result in the view of the Supreme Court.
It is possible to extract from the opinion in the Automatic Canteen
case references to such considerations which the Court might find persuasive if the question was squarely presented to it.
A. Convenience. The Automatic Canteen opinion made reference to the importance of convenience as one reason for having a
different procedural rule in buyer cases.43 Although there apparently
40 80 CoNG.

REc. 8241 (1936).
if the buyer has the 'same' burden as the seller, the fact that a seller has the
bu,:den to show his costs does not automatically, by virtue oE §2(£), become a buyer's
burden to show the seller's cost." Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S.
61 at 78, n. 21, 73 S.Ct. 1017 (1953).
42 In the Morton Salt case, the Court relied on the rule that the burden oE prooE is on
the party seeking to come within a statutory exception. 334 U.S. 37 at 44-45, 68 S.Ct. 822
(1948).
43 "Considerations oE fairness and convenience operative in other proceedings must,
we think, have been controlling in the dra&ing oE §2(b), for it would require far clearer
language than we have here to reach a contrary result. • • • If that is so • • • decisions
striking the 'balance oE convenience for Commission proceedings against sellers are beside the
point." Automatic Canteen Co. oE America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 at 78, 73 S.Ct. 1017
(1953).
41 ''Even
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was some dispute as to just how great would be the burden of-showing cost justification, the Court assumed that the standard would be
the same as that required by the Commission in seller proceedings
and that a study showing exact costs therefore would be necessary.44
The burden would have been particularly heavy for the buyer in the
Automatic Canteen case, for the costs of approximately eighty different
sellers were in issue.45 It obviously is more convenient for a seller to
obtain information about his costs than it is for a buyer to get information from his sellers about their costs.46 As between the Commission
and the buyer, the Commission is in a better position to obtain cost
information than the buyer because of the investigatory powers delegated to it.47
·

B. Antitrust Policy. Another reason for distinguishing buyer
cases on the burden of proof question is that requiring buyers to get
cost information from their sellers would result in cooperation which
might be adverse to general antitrust policy. The disclosure of the
sellers' cost secrets would make future arm's-length bargaining difficult.48
·
C. Consumer Interest in Cost Savings. Perhaps the most important reason for distinguishing a buyer case from a seller case for
the purpose of proving costs lies in the statutory policy of maintaining
a system which encourages the passing on of cost savings to consumers.49 The competitive bargaining process has been the main reliance
of our economic system in the past for the passing on of such savings.
To subject buyers to prosecution each time their bargaining results
44 See

Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 44 F.T.C. 351 (1948); 65 HARv. L.

REv. 1011 (1952); FEDERAL TRADn CoMMissioN, CAs:s STOD:ms IN D1ST1Ullt1TION CoST

AccotINTING l.'OR MAN-al.'AC'l'tJRING ~ W:s:or.nsALING, H. Doc. No. 287, 77th Cong.,
1st sess. (1941).
45Automatic Canteen Co. of .America v. FfC, 346 U.S. 61 at 69, 73 S.Ct. 1017
(1953).
46 The Court suggested that the Commission :in the future might want to join the
seller and his buyers :in the same proceeding. Id. at 79. For an example of this procedure,
see Bird and Sons, Inc., Bird Floor Covering Sales Corp., Montgomezy Ward and Co., 25
F.T.C. 548 (1937). Treble damage actions against the seller and buyer were heard and
decided together :in .American Cooperative Serum Assn. v. Anchor Serum Co., (7th Cir.
1946) 153 F. (2d) 907.
47 Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FfC, 346 U.S. 61 at 79, 73 S.Ct. 1017
(1953). For :investigatory powers of the Commission, see 38 Stat. L. 722 (1914), 15
u.s.c. (1946) §§46, 49.
4BAutomatic Canteen Co. of America v. FfC, 346 U.S. 61 at 69, 73 S.Ct. 1017
(1953).
49 See H. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d sess., p. 17 (1936); see also the statement
of Mr. Teegarden, Hearing before the House Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 8442,
H.R. 4995, and H.R. 5062, 74th Cong., 1st sess., p. 22 (1935).
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in price differentials, an inevitable product of competitive bargaining,
would undermine our "sturdy bargaining" system60 and result in a rigid
price structure offering little opportunity for ultimate consumers to
enjoy the benefit of cost savings.

IV. Conclusion
The decision in the Automatic Canteen case places on the Commission the burden of introducing evidence tending to show knowledge that price differentials were greater than sellers' cost savings
in proceedings against buyers. The Court did not answer the question of who has the burden of proving the sellers' costs once a
prima facie case of violation of section 2(£) of the Robinson-Patman
Act has been made against a buyer. The various considerations emphasized by the Court as important in distinguishing buyer cases from
seller cases, taken together with the fact that the Court did not think
the result reached in the Morton Salt case controlling, add strength
to the proposition that a buyer does not have the burden of proving
his seller's costs as justification in a section 2(£) proceeding against him.
Arthur M. Wisehart, S.Ed.*
uo Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FfC, 346 U.S. 61 at 74, 73 S.Ct. 1017
(1953).
"' The wrlter is indebted to William K. Davenport, S.Ed., for some of the preliminary
research used in this comment.

